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Article 8

Testimonial Statements under Crawford
WHAT MAKES TESTIMONY . . . TESTIMONIAL?
Brooks Holland †
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Crawford v. Washington, 1 the United States Supreme
Court discarded the reliability framework that had governed
the admissibility of hearsay statements under the
Confrontation Clause for more than twenty years. 2 In its
stead, the Court adopted an unforgiving procedural guarantee:
testimonial hearsay statements by non-testifying declarants
may not be admitted at trial unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. 3 The majority in Crawford, however, left
the precise meaning of “testimonial” statements “for another
day,” 4 casting a shadow of uncertainty over a major component
of criminal practice. 5
This essay attempts to detangle the concept of
testimonial statements. As Mark Dwyer of the New York
County District Attorney’s Office noted during our conference
at Brooklyn Law School, my proposed definition may amount to
mere “wishful thinking.” 6 But, it is a definition that makes
sense to me. And not just theoretically, but also practically,
after more than a decade of trying criminal cases.

†
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law.
J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 1994. From 1994 to 2005,
the author worked as a public defender in New York City.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004). In an effort to maintain brevity, this essay presumes
the reader’s basic familiarity with Crawford.
2
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
3
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-58, 59, 61, 68.
4
Id. at 68.
5
See id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
6
Mark Dwyer, Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay” Category: A Plain Limit on
the Protections of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 277, 279 (2005).
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DEFINING TESTIMONY

Crawford offers a lot of cryptic clues about what
“testimonial” may mean – historical clues, terminological clues,
governmental “abuse” clues, and three oft-cited definitional
clues. 7 Yet, as the diversity of judicial decisions interpreting
Crawford demonstrates, 8 Crawford fails to identify a clear
commonality to “testimony” that accurately defines when a
statement is “testimonial” instead of something else that is
produced when a person speaks about facts or opinions.
History may play an important role in revealing this
commonality, as a panel at our conference discussed in detail.
I will suggest a couple of additional questions that perhaps
should weigh upon this historical analysis. My main goal here,
however, will be to define testimony from my practical
perspective of having spent the last eleven years as a criminal
defense attorney observing, producing and cross-examining
witness testimony. The hope is not to argue the testimonial
status of every common type of hearsay statement, but rather
to identify a core ingredient of testimony that may serve as a
broad guide to resolving these questions.
A.

Looking to History to Define Testimony

The discussion of history’s role in shaping confrontation
doctrine raises two questions for me. The first relates to the
“not enough like Raleigh” approach to testimonial statements.
Crawford, of course, treated us to a detailed historical backdrop
to the adoption of the Confrontation Clause. This backdrop
focused on several high-profile political trials during 16th, 17th
and 18th century England and colonial times, 9 especially the
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, which the Court
characterized as “a paradigmatic confrontation violation.” 10
Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, did not testify at
Raleigh’s trial and thus could not be cross-examined, as
Raleigh demanded. Instead, Cobham’s statements were taken
ex parte by an investigating “Privy Council” prior to trial, and
his accusations were presented at trial in hearsay form. The
7

See generally State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 766-68 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
See id. at 768-79 (cataloguing decisions); see also Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation, http://www.dwt.com/
lawdir/publications/CrawfordOutline.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
9
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50.
10
Id. at 52.
8
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Court in Crawford identified this “civil-law mode of criminal
procedure” as the “principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed.” 11 And since Crawford, some courts have
seized upon the Raleigh paradigm to find hearsay statements
nontestimonial because they did not sufficiently mirror the
formality of Cobham’s pre-trial examination or the other
historical
illustrations
of
civil-law
mode
pre-trial
examinations. 12
In today’s era, it is a serious mistake to define the
prevailing model of criminal practice by the generally
unrepresentative events of celebrity trials. And, I gather that
the Raleigh case was very much the celebrity prosecution of its
day, as were the other political trials discussed in Crawford.
So, maybe the question should be asked, were run-of-the-mill
ex parte witness examinations in the Raleigh era really that
formal? I do not know the answer. The comments of some of
our conference panelists, however, suggest that they may not
have been. So if, for example, the typical historical ex parte
witness examination more routinely involved a citizen-initiated
complaint, 13 brought to the local farmer-by-day-justice-of-thepeace-by-night, under relatively informal circumstances, postCrawford courts may have been basing confrontation decisions
on a flawed expectation of formality generated by a historical
version of the O.J. trial. Either way, none of the courts
decreeing “not enough like Raleigh” has explored whether the
formal nature of Cobham’s examination in Raleigh accurately
depicts the prevailing day-to-day criminal practice of the time,
and if not, whether this fact alters the historical analysis.
My second question concerns what this prevailing
historical practice should tell us about modern criminal
practice. Some courts have determined that the historical
practice targeted by the Confrontation Clause informs us of the
degree of formality we should expect from a modern criminal

11

Id. at 50.
See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1713 (2005); People
v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856-57 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that “[w]e cannot
believe that the framers would have seen a ‘striking resemblance’ between Deputy
Mullin’s interview with John at the hospital and a justice of the peace’s pretrial
examination”), rev. granted and op. superseded by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
13
Cf. Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and
Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 458 (2004) (noting that “in older
systems . . . there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their families prosecuted
crimes themselves”).
12
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investigation before it will produce a testimonial statement. 14
But, this view focuses on the circumstances surrounding an
out-of-court statement instead of the trial at which it is offered,
which for confrontation purposes may be asking the wrong
question. Rather, the more germane question may be whether
the shift away from the civil-law mode of procedure to the
confrontation model reflected in the Sixth Amendment
effectively ended the historical practice of admitting out-ofcourt statements at trial by non-testifying declarants. Or, did
a robust practice of admitting such statements still persist
except for the very formalized types of pre-trial statements
illustrated by the Raleigh case? If the latter is true, then the
many post-Crawford decisions admitting substantial hearsay
as “not enough like Raleigh” may be on the right track.
But, from the comments of our panelists who study this
history, I suspect that the former is more likely. If so, modern
courts may be ignoring the proper historical emphasis: by
constitutionally eliminating the “principle evil” illustrated by
the Raleigh case, the Framers established an historical practice
model that resulted in few, if any, out-of-court statements by
non-testifying declarants being admitted at trial. 15 If history is
indeed to guide us, a broad modern hearsay exception should
not unseat this constitutionally enshrined practice model,
“even if that exception might be justifiable in other
circumstances.” 16 Instead, in defining “testimonial,” and
thereby setting the primary if not exclusive scope of
confrontation rights, we should view our modern criminal
practices through the lens of this historical practice model that
permitted few if any out-of-court statements by non-testifying
declarants at trial. Otherwise, despite our asserted fidelity to
history, we risk establishing a modern criminal practice model
14

See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 12.
Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (explaining that “[t]he common-law tradition
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law
condones examination in private by judicial officers”); id. at 56 n.6, 58 n.8 (noting that
few, if any, modern hearsay exceptions were recognized in 1791, with the exception of
the dying declaration exception and perhaps a very circumscribed version of the
spontaneous declaration exception). Cf. also, e.g., Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d
799, 808 (D.C. 2005) (discussing modern expansion of excited utterance hearsay
exception), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005); Richard D.
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1209-24
(2002) (surveying historical development of excited utterance exception). But cf. People
v. Rincon, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 858 (Ct. App. 2005) (claiming that elements of
California’s spontaneous statement exception “are largely identical to the common law
hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as described in Crawford”).
16
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.
15
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that at the stage where confrontation matters – trial – looks
nothing like what the Framers created for themselves.
B.

Testimony: Part of a Process

In Crawford, the Supreme Court told us that testimony
typically means “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” 17 This
definition, however, raises more questions than it answers.
Even with the three oft-cited formulations of testimony
outlined in Crawford, 18 not only did the Court mysteriously
decline to adopt any of them, it also failed to articulate the
“common nucleus” that they all supposedly share. 19 The
Court’s practical illustrations also failed to clarify the meaning
of testimony, as the Court offered only the obvious extremes of
the testimonial spectrum: traditional courtroom testimony and
custodial police interrogations on the one hand, and a casual or
off-hand remark to an acquaintance on the other. 20
The Court simply did not tell us what feature, other
than our ingrained assumptions, makes the former statements
testimonial but the latter nontestimonial, so that we can know
what to do with the statements in between.
Is the
determinative factor the formal judicial or quasi-judicial
circumstances surrounding the statement when made? The
nature or degree of any interrogation by the questioner? The
involvement of a government actor in producing the statement?
The questioner’s purpose in interrogating the declarant? The
declarant’s subjective awareness of any or all of these facts?
My experience tells me that while these factors all can
bear on the ultimate question of whether a statement
constitutes testimony, none is a necessary ingredient to it.
Rather, the common ingredient to testimony that I consistently
have observed is notice, or foreseeability, to a declarant that
his or her statement will contribute to a formal decisionmaking process. Factors like formality, interrogation, and
questioner or declarant intent all matter, but only because they
may demonstrate this foreseeability, not because any one factor
or combination of factors necessarily defines testimony. An
exploration of these factors should illustrate.
17
18
19
20

Id. at 51 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 51-52.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 51-52, 68.
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1. Formality & Foreseeability
Emphasizing Crawford’s admonition that “[a]n accuser
who makes a formal statement . . . bears testimony,” 21 several
courts have placed heavy emphasis on whether an out-of-court
statement was given under particularly formal circumstances
in determining whether it proves to be testimonial. 22 Many of
these formality lines drawn by lower courts, however, strike me
as arbitrary and disconnected from any meaningful conception
of testimony – such as the line that makes narrative,
accusatory statements to police officers at a precinct
sufficiently formal, but the very same statements to the very
same officers on the street or at a hospital, or through 911,
insufficiently so. 23
Perhaps the mistake rests in focusing on the formality
of the circumstances surrounding an out-of-court statement
when it is uttered instead of the formal purpose to which the
statement will be put. “Testimony” cannot conceptually be
divorced from the broader purpose that it serves and that
distinguishes it from mere words. Testimony at its core
contributes to formal fact resolution, and consequently, to a
formal decision-making process. 24 This process frequently is
fluid and multi-layered, running in a criminal case, for
instance, from the decision to arrest and charge, to a
preliminary hearing and grand jury proceedings, to pre-trial
hearings and the trial itself, and sometimes even to postconviction proceedings. Witness statements guide these very
formal decisions throughout the adjudicative process. To freeze
21

Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., People v. Ferrell, No. B172129, 2005 WL 977609, at *12 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 28, 2005) (unpublished); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775-77 (Ct.
App. 2004); People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 17, 2004); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 305
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005).
23
See, e.g., Jimenez, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12 (street); People v. Lennon,
No. B169775, 2005 WL 957751, at *11-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2005) (unpublished)
(hospital); People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2005) (911 call). Cf.
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 855 (Wash. 2005) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting lack of
coherence to majority’s theory of testimony that holds the complainant’s most
incriminating statements during a 911 call to be nontestimonial, while identifying
other portions of the same call as testimonial).
24
Although confrontation interests are invoked by testimony, the purpose of
testimony must be considered discretely from the purposes of confrontation.
Confrontation refines the presentation of testimony; it does not itself define testimony.
See Friedman, supra note 13, at 441-43 (discussing purposes behind confrontation).
22
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an out-of-court statement in its static surrounding
environment, therefore, when considering whether it is
testimonial in character artificially removes the statement
from the broader process of fact adjudication that gives
testimony its defining character. 25 The question of formality
instead needs to be more forward-looking so as to account for
this ongoing decision-making process.
Of course, the formality of the surrounding environment
often will alert a declarant to the formal decision-making
purpose reserved for his or her statement, and thus, these
factors remain relevant. A person making statements to a
grand jury, for example, has notice from that environment
alone that this judicial body will use the statements for a
formal adjudicative purpose.
But even in a traditional
testimonial setting like the grand jury, testimony does not
derive its character from the contemporaneous externalities
that surround it, but rather from its role in this process of
formal fact adjudication – such as the grand jury’s decision
whether to indict, a formal decision that certainly does not
happen contemporaneously with the giving of testimony.
The absence of terribly formal circumstances
surrounding a statement, therefore, should not become a
superficial talisman for nontestimonial hearsay rulings. The
determinative question instead should be whether the
surrounding circumstances notified the declarant of the formal
adjudicative process to which the statement will contribute, for
a statement’s contribution to that process sits at the heart of its
character as testimony – and of the need for confrontation if it
is offered at trial. This question asks more than just a longwinded version of the third formulation of testimony suggested
in Crawford: “statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 26
It recognizes that testimony contributes to a broader and more
fluid process than just the end-game of trial where
confrontation is implicated, and that the concept of testimony
therefore cannot be restricted solely to consideration of its use

25
Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (2004) (defining testimony broadly as a
statement “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact”).
26
Id. at 52.
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at the adversarial stage of the adjudicative process requiring
confrontation. 27
This view of testimony, moreover, means a declarant
need not necessarily anticipate or have an interest in
In my experience,
advancing the adjudicative process. 28
traditional witnesses testify with a wide range of awareness,
expectations and interests, varying from fully engaged to
totally out of it. The exact rate and degree of these subjective
considerations is really irrelevant, because we do not test
courtroom witnesses on them before they are asked to give
testimony. 29 Instead, it is the notice on which traditional
witnesses are placed of the formal decision-making purpose
reserved for their statements that makes them “witnesses” who
“testify.” This notice fairly creates the external expectation that
a witness, for better or worse, will appreciate this formal
purpose and that his or her statements thus will be subject to
adversarial testing. 30 The standard should prove no different
with out-of-court testimony.
27

Indeed, nothing about the concept of testimony indicates that it should be
restricted to statements made in furtherance of a criminal prosecution, and I have seen
no meaningful definitional distinction between civil and criminal “testimony.” Cf.
United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that whether the
witness’ sworn civil deposition “is ‘testimonial’ as Crawford used that term is
uncertain”); United States v. Moffie, No. 1:04 CR 567, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462, at
*22-23 (N.D. Ohio May 11, 2005). Cf. also Richard D. Friedman et al., Listening to
Crawford
1
(Feb.
15,
2005)
(unpublished
article,
available
at
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/case-of-censorship.html) (arguing that a
person testifies when he or she “states information to a person of authority or
otherwise makes a statement that a reasonable person would understand will likely be
used for evidentiary purposes” (emphasis added)); but cf. Richard D. Friedman,
Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial 8 (Feb. 16, 2005) (draft, available at
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/grappling-with-meaning-oftestimonial.html) (noting that “anticipation of use in prosecution is the key question in
determining whether a statement is testimonial” (emphasis added)).
28
Cf., e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004)
(reasoning that “Crawford at least suggests that the determinative factor in
determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s awareness or
expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a trial”); State v. Hembertt,
696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2005) (holding that “[t]he inquiry is whether . . . the
declarant intended to bear testimony against the accused,” and thus, “[t]he
determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the
declarant’s awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a
trial”).
29
Cf. State v. Krasky, 696 N.W.2d 816, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (Crippen,
J., dissenting) (explaining that “the notion of an inquiry on the sophistication of the
declarant might reasonably be abandoned due [to] its inevitable absurdity”); In re
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
30
In most traditional testimonial settings, this notice is established first and
foremost by administration of an oath. Once a witness has sworn or affirmed to tell the
truth, what the witness actually expects or desires about the role of his or her
statements becomes irrelevant, as the oath creates our external expectation that the
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Therefore, I would suggest that Crawford’s “formality”
analysis properly should be an objective, forward-looking one:
Did the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement
make its formal, adjudicative use foreseeable to the declarant? 31
If so, the out-of-court witness as much as the in-court witness
speaks with the external expectation that his or her statements
will affect this process, and thus must be treated accordingly –
as testimony, and not simply mere words.
This foreseeability should not be obviated by an out-ofcourt witness’ excitement or stress, contrary to the view of
several post-Crawford courts. 32 Witnesses testify in courtrooms
every day while experiencing tremendous stress, excitement,
anxiety and every other form of emotion that might still their
capacity for reflection and contrivance. Yet, we do not declare
adversarial testing of their statements unnecessary, because
these witnesses nevertheless remain on notice of the formal use
intended for their statements sufficient to prompt our external
expectation that these statements will be weighed and tested
as testimony. A witness’ demeanor and emotional state simply
become factors to be considered when his or her testimony is
weighed in the decision-making process. No different analysis
should apply to out-of-court statements that happen to qualify
as excited utterances, except perhaps for truly spontaneous,
exclamatory statements that fall closer to the narrow
spontaneous declaration exception that may have existed in

witness will testify accordingly. As Crawford suggests, however, while administration
of an oath certainly bespeaks of testimony, it is not a precondition to testimony if other
circumstances fairly create the same testimonial expectations. See Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 52 n.3.
31
Cf. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Mass. 2005)
(adopting “a formulation that would find testimonial all statements the declarant knew
or should have known might be used to investigate or prosecute an accused” (second
emphasis added)).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that “the statements of an adolescent boy who has called 911 while
witnessing an argument between his aunt and her partner escalate to assault would be
emotional and spontaneous rather than deliberate and calculated. We hold that [the
declarant’s] 911 call was an excited utterance, and under these circumstances,
nontestimonial” (citation omitted)); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 n.3
(1st Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “the excited utterance of fourteen-year-old Camacho as
he flagged down Officer Thornton immediately following the incident clearly does not
fall within the meaning of testimonial hearsay as it is used Crawford”); State v. Banks,
No. 03AP-1286, 2004 WL 2809070, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004) (holding that
“Crawford only applies to statements that . . . are not subject to common-law
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterance”). See generally Anderson v.
State, 111 P.3d 350, 354 n.26 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (cataloguing additional
authorities).
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1791. 33 These latter statements remain so interconnected to
the factual incident being referenced that future use of the
statements simply no longer proves foreseeable. 34
2. Interrogation & Questioner Intent
This forward-looking view of “formality” also means that
“interrogation” of one form or another should not dictate
whether a statement is testimonial.
At trial, direct
examination tends to involve open-ended questions like “what
happened,” while cross-examination involves leading questions.
Answers to both are surely witness testimony. Indeed, some of
the most effective examinations of trial witnesses I have seen
are when a lawyer asks very few open-ended questions, with
the witness so well prepared and aware of his or her role that
“structured” interrogation becomes unnecessary for effective
testimony. Why should a different standard apply to out-ofcourt witnesses, requiring “structured” interrogation as a
precondition to testimony? 35 To testify, of course, a witness
33
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004). Cf. Bockting v.
Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring) (criticizing
admission of declarant’s statement under Crawford even though “[i]t may have been an
excited or spontaneous utterance”); Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807-15 (D.C.
2005) (noting broad modern expansion of historical spontaneous declaration hearsay
exception and concluding that “the findings necessary to support a conclusion that a
statement was an excited utterance do not conflict with those that are necessary to
support a conclusion that it was testimonial . . . under Crawford, reliability has no
bearing on the question of whether a statement was testimonial”), vacated, reh’g en
banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005); Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that “we do not think that excited utterances can be
automatically excluded from the class of testimonial statements”); Gonsalves, 833
N.E.2d at 559 (concluding that “a statement can be both testimonial in nature and a
spontaneous utterance . . . . Nothing in Crawford indicates the two are mutually
exclusive. In fact, quite the contrary. In dicta in a footnote, the Court suggested such
utterances can be testimonial, depending on the applicable State’s hearsay law”); State
v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1263-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that while “[t]he trial
judge characterized [the 911] call as an excited utterance . . . based on indicia of
reliability and trustworthiness, Crawford clearly rejects the admission of testimonial
statements based on ‘the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of ‘reliability’’”). Cf. generally State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2005)
(severely restricting scope of New Jersey’s excited utterance hearsay exception to
conform to its narrow historical form and justification); State v. Cotto, 865 A.2d 660
(N.J. 2005) (same).
34
For an example of an arguably nontestimonial excited utterance, albeit
under a different analysis, see People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
35
See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476-77 (App. Div. 2005)
(evaluating responding police officer’s question of “what happened” and concluding that
“[e]ven assuming that the circumstances under which the statement was obtained can
be considered an ‘interrogation,’ they are hardly comparable to the ‘structured
interrogation’ found to be subject to the Confrontation Clause in Crawford,” which the
court characterized as “detailed, particularized and memorialized questioning”); State
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must be doing something more than just yelling into the wind,
and the manner of an interrogation may signal to the declarant
what he or she should expect when responding. But, whether a
questioner uses open-ended or leading questions, or otherwise
“interrogates” the declarant in a particularly “structured”
manner, again seems ancillary to the real question: whether
the declarant spoke on notice that his or her statements would
contribute to a formal adjudicative process. 36
This proper focus on the role of interrogation in shaping
testimony demonstrates why, contrary to some courts’ view,
“the objective of the person posing the question” does not
dictate whether the declarant’s response is testimonial. 37 For
instance, in People v. Bradley, 38 the court focused on the noninvestigative objectives of a police officer asking a domestic
violence victim “what happened” in finding her response that
her boyfriend had thrown her through a glass door
nontestimonial. 39 True, “what happened” is a pretty innocuous
question that in a complete vacuum may not signal any
particularly formal adjudicative role for the response. But, this
question was not asked in a vacuum in Bradley. Rather, it was
asked by a uniformed police officer responding to a 911 call who
met an injured and bleeding domestic violence victim who
already had an order of protection against the defendant and
who accused him of further crimes. 40
Of course, the officer in Bradley did not know all of
these facts surrounding his question until he asked it and
received an accusatory response. 41 But, the victim did. And
these known circumstances should have notified the victim
v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004) (finding complainant’s statements
nontestimonial because “she was not responding to tactically structured police
questioning as in Crawford”); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (opining that “[w]e also believe that ‘interrogation’ carries with it a connotation
of an at least slightly adversarial setting”), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
36
Cf. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555-57 (rejecting formulaic approach to
“interrogation,” applying instead “everyday, common understandings of the term, both
in the general public and the legal community,” and thus viewing answers to police
questions unrelated to the police “community caretaking function and the need to
secure a volatile scene” as per se testimonial).
37
Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d at 480. A definition of testimony that hinges on the
questioner’s intent also raises concerns about law enforcement’s ability to construct
questions that strategically ensure that the response is deemed nontestimonial. See
Friedman, supra note 13, at 458.
38
799 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 2005).
39
See id. at 474, 477-80.
40
See id. at 474-75.
41
See id. at 480.
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that her response would contribute to a formal decision-making
process, a decisional process that would begin with the officer’s
response to her accusation. Indeed, that the officer in Bradley
may not have drawn any firm conclusions prior to asking “what
happened” illustrates the testimonial nature of the victim’s
response, for it informed his formal decision-making just as it
would have informed a jury’s decision-making if the victim
instead had given her statement from the witness chair in
response to a prosecutor asking “what happened.” The court in
Bradley improperly ignored this context surrounding the
victim’s response and its role in the decision-making process,
and instead isolated the officer’s purpose in asking the question
to define the response. 42 This artificial divorce of question from
answer does not reflect any real conception of testimony. 43
3. Governmental “Abuse”
The Court in Crawford referred to concerns over
governmental abuse, 44 and government actors took the disputed
statement in Crawford. Several courts have seemingly read
these portions of Crawford as a cue to look for governmental
action in the taking of any challenged statement as a condition
to it being testimonial.
Nothing in Crawford, however, indicates that the
governmental abuse it seeks to prevent, occurs, or only occurs,
Indeed, to focus on
during the taking of statements. 45
governmental abuse during the taking of a statement rather
than at its introduction at trial misses the point of
confrontation. 46 Consider a practical illustration. A colleague
at my office recently tried a domestic violence case where the
complainant gave an initial accusatory narrative statement to
42
See, e.g., id. at 480 (explaining that “[r]ather than attempting to assess the
expectation of the declarant regarding the probable use of any statement that might be
forthcoming, the better approach is to evaluate the objective of the person posing the
question . . . . Thus, [a] response [that] is not the product of a structured police
interrogation . . . should not be regarded as testimonial”).
43
Perhaps this necessary relationship between question and answer to a
broader understanding of testimony underscores the traditional refrain that trial
judges offer to juries: a question alone never constitutes testimony; only an answer
joined with a question creates testimony.
44
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (expressing
concern that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with
an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”).
45
Cf. id. at 51 (referring generally to “the civil-law abuses the Confrontation
Clause targeted”).
46
Cf. Friedman, supra note 13, at 457-58.
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responding police officers, but later recanted and did not
appear at trial. The prosecution introduced the complainant’s
initial accusation to the police, which the trial court deemed an
excited utterance. No serious effort was made to subpoena the
complainant for trial, nor did the prosecution allege that the
defendant improperly procured her recantation, so nothing
indicated that she in fact was “unavailable” to testify.
A definition of testimony that focuses on governmental
“abuse” prior to trial will find none in this case. The police
engaged in no abuse by taking the complainant’s ex parte
statement prior to trial – such interviews are a routine and
entirely proper part of police investigative work. Nor did the
government engage in any abuse by not producing her for
cross-examination prior to trial – the defendant had no freestanding constitutional right to pre-trial confrontation. No
abuse occurred if the prosecution unilaterally concluded that
the complainant’s initial accusation provided the most reliable
account of the defendant’s conduct – prosecutors are charged
with making exactly this sort of decision as part of the
adjudicative process.
Rather, the abuse in this case – and with all similar
confrontation violations – occurred when the prosecution
usurped the fact-finding process at trial, and ensured that the
trial retained an investigative rather than adversarial
character, by presenting an unchallengeable narrative that
already had shaped and guided the fact-finding process leading
to trial, and certainly would at trial as well. To suggest that
this role of the complainant’s statements was not foreseeable
constructs a definition of testimony that simply does not exist
elsewhere – one that limits consideration of its procedural use
only to trial and requires the witness to subjectively appreciate
this narrow role for it. Any conception of confrontation that
expresses concern for governmental abuse must focus on
exactly this type of prosecutorial strategy to sanitize the factfinding process at trial. 47
This observation returns me to the concept of testimony
as contributing to a formal, decision-making process. Under
this concept, the governmental status of the interrogator
should bear on whether a statement proves testimonial only to
47
Cf. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J.,
concurring); Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence
in New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171,
199 (2002).
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the extent that the interrogator’s status makes the statement’s
injection into this process foreseeable.
To paraphrase
Crawford itself, a statement to a police officer possesses a
foreseeable significance to it in this way that a statement to a
friend usually does not, 48 because to most people, the police and
similar authority figures acting in an investigative capacity
communicate a clear message: what you say will be included in
a formal decision-making process. 49 For children, however,
parents and guardians may assume this role as much or even
more than law enforcement, as perhaps no one is more
empowered to resolve formal disputes in a child’s mind than
his or her parent. 50 Even a private party such as a medical
professional may take a testimonial statement, if the
circumstances demonstrate that this person foreseeably will
inject the statement into a formal adjudicative process. 51 By
contrast, people speaking in furtherance of a conspiracy or
completing business records, 52 or speaking to an acquaintance
in private, 53 generally have no reason to foresee that their
statements will contribute to anything beyond their nonadjudicative function.
III.

CONCLUSION

The only true commonality that I have observed of all
“testimony” is the foreseeability of that statement’s
contribution to a formal, adjudicative process. In the end,
therefore, that process is the key to unlocking the meaning of
testimony, and not artificial notions of formality, statement
content, witness cognition, interrogation structure or
48

Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Cf. United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 903-04 (6th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Summers, 414
F.3d 1287, 1302-03, (10th Cir. 2005); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549,
557-59 (Mass. 2005); cf. also United States v. Hinton, No. 03-3803, 2005 WL 2218919,
at *3-5 (3rd Cir. 2005). For an interesting example of how witness statements quickly
may transform from nontestimonial to testimonial in the course of a hectic police
investigation, see People v. Watson, 798 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (unpublished).
50
Cf. In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), appeal
granted, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005); cf. also People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 296-99 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (Neville, J., dissenting).
51
Cf., e.g., In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding
statements by complainant to physician during medical evaluation generally
nontestimonial, except for her identification of defendant as her abuser).
52
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
53
Cf. People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 535-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 WL 2376474 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004).
49
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interrogator status. A definition of testimony that emphasizes
this “common nucleus” 54 will ensure that the proper range of
hearsay statements by non-testifying declarants is excluded in
criminal trials, unless such statements satisfy Crawford’s
properly unforgiving procedural guarantee. 55

54

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
Or, unless the prosecution can establish that the defendant has forfeited
any claim to confrontation, a subject beyond the scope of this essay. For an interesting
debate on confrontation forfeiture, check out Richard D. Friedman’s blog at
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (last visited October 10, 2005). See also State v.
Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005) (noting the “special concerns” that domestic
violence cases raise for potential forfeiture by wrongdoing).
55

